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Changes in the Differential Tax Burden, 1940-1952
THE procedures described in the preceding chapters were undertaken
for each of the years in the period 1940-1952, with the exception of
1942 and 1943 for which years the data required in our calculations
were not published. Having examined the findings for 1950 in detail,
we can go on to discuss in more summary fashion the results for the
other years covered by the study.
That there should be sizeable differences among years is hardly
surprising. The results are the outcome of interaction of a number
of factors which varied significantly in level and relative weight from
year to year (see Table 6). The primary direct determinants of the
value of the differentials are:
1. The level of corporate tax rates (columns 4 and 6)
2. The level of personal income tax rates (column 1), and the slope
ofthe rate schedule, i.e., the rapidity with which the effective
rate rises
S. The amount and relative importance of earnings for distribution
and for retention (columns 3 and 5, and 7 and 8)
4. The amount of net corporate earnings (columns 2 and 9)
1. With everything else equal, the higher the corporate tax rate,
the greater the extra burden against earnings for distribution, earn-
ings for retention, corporate earnings and stockholders.
2. Conversely, with other factors unchanged, the higher the personal
income tax rate, the lower the extra burden in all these connections.
Similarly, the more progressive the rate schedule, i.e., the more rapidly
the marginal rate increases, the less onerous these extra burdens be.
come as stockholder income rises.
3. The extra burden (or benefit) on net corporate earnings is a
weighted average of (a) the extra burden on earnings for distribution E
and of(b) the extra burden or benefit on earnings for retention.
Therefore, the higher the proportion of earnings for distribution, the
greater the weight of (a) in the determination of the extra burden
(or benefit) on net corporate earnings. The importance of these pro-
portionate interrelationsisparticularly apparent at those income
levels where we find an extra burden on earnings for distribution and
a net tax saving on earnings for retention; but their importance is
also obvious at all stockholder income levels.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































from net corporate earnings determines the degree of over- or under-
CHART
taxation of stockholders.
The reader is reminded of the amplified treatment of these factors
and their interrelations in determining the differential tax burden
on stockholders given in the two preceding chapters. This cursory
recapitulation will serve as a point of departure for our investigation
of the variations found over the period of the study.
I-,-.
COMPARISONOF DIFFERENTIALS OVER THE PERIOD +20
FROM 1940 THROUGH 1952
0
Over the years 1940 through 1952, what were the trends in differential
taxation of stockholders? For tracing the directions and extent of +80
change, four selected income levels are analyzed and shown graphi-
cally in Chart 4. For this purpose $3,000 is taken as representative of
+60
the bottom of the stockholder income scale, $500,000 to summarize +40
the experience at the top, and $10,000 and $50,000 to cover the range
in between.' As in Chapter 2, the values are derived in terms of +20 -
variant2 (although data for variants 1 and 3 would show essentially
similar patterns). — 0
Consider first the trend in the differential against earnings for dis-
tribution(panel A). While there are slight variations in its time -
patternat the lower and upper income levels; in general there occurs
a rise in the first years of our period, then a decline reaching a low
—40-
in1946, and finally year-to-year increases up through 1951 with a
slightfall in 1952. A detailed analysis, to illustrate the operation of
the previously noted factors determining the height of the differential, :
is given later in this chapter. The chief points relevant to Chart 4
are that a rise in the corporate tax rate increases the differential, and
a rise in personal tax rates causes it to decline. The rise in the extra
0 burden on earnings for distribution during the early years of our
period is explained, therefore, by the sharper increase in corporate
rates compared with personal tax rates. In 1945 the effective rate of
corporate income tax was lower than in 1944 (primarily because of
+20 a pronounced fall in excess profits tax liability), and with the end of
the war corporate rates were cut more sharply than the personal 0
income tax schedule; thus the fall in the differential. Note what
happened between 1947 and 1948. The introduction of income split- —20
ting in 1948 led to a decline in personal income tax rates—slight at 1940'41
the lower income levels but substantial for higher income stockholders.
'For tabulations of the differentials for every year of this period at all nineteen
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This explains the slight rise between these two years in the differen-
tial against earnings for distribution at the $3,000 stockholder income
level, and the very great increase that occurred at $500,000. Once
again in 1950 and 1951 heavier increases in corporate than in per-
sonal rate were set; the differentials rose. The fall in 1952 is due to
the rise in personal rates(increases introduced for the last several
months of 1951 and in effect throughout 1952) and to the slight fall
in the effective corporate rate.2
In panel B of the chart the differential against earnings for reten-
tion shows a steady decline from the beginning of the period up
through 1947, followed by a pattern similar to that observed for the
differential against earnings for distribution. In some years between
1940 and 1947 the effective corporate rate applicable to earnings for
retention actually declined; in the other years its rise was not sharp
enough to counteract the effect on the differential exerted by the
increase in personal rates.3 From 1947 on, the movement of the differ-
ential was shaped by the same factors noted in connection with the
differential against earnings for distribution.
Of more direct importance is the behavior of the net resultant of
these two measures, i.e. the differential against (or in favor of) the
net corporate earnings component of stockholder income (panel C).
In general, at all four income levels we find a decline over the early
part of our period reaching a low in and then a rise over the
remainder with a slight dip between 1951 and 1952. Of particular
interest is the fact that coincident with the sharp rise in corporate
and personal income tax rates that took place during the war, there
occurred a substantial decrease in the overtaxation of stockholders'
pro rata share of net corporate earnings. A striking result of this
decline, noted previously, appears at the upper end of the income
distribution, epitomized in this summary by $500,000; the overtaxa-
tion of net corporate earnings changed to undertaxation in 1944, and
the differential continued below zero for the rest of the period covered
by the investigation. Comparison of the values of the differentials
at the four selected income levels shows a tendency to cluster in 1940
2Theanalysis in this paragraph is sketchy. It fails to take account of the propor-
tion that corporate earnings and earnings for distribution constitute of stockholder
income, variations in which would affect the personal rate that would have been
applied against the corporate tax paid on earnings for distribution. But this degree
of detail is not required here.
SLosseswhich are subtracted from income to determine earnings for retention
were proportionately greater in 1940 than in 1941. That is why the effective rate
of corporate tax on earnings for retention was higher in 1940 than in 1941, even
though the rates fixed by law were lower.
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and a pronounced widening of the gap between those at the lower
income and those at the upper income levels by 1952. Little change
in the differential values occurred at the bottom of the income scale,
the widening gap being caused by the falling differentials at the top.
Imputed gross Differential against net
income level corporate earnings Change in
($000's) 1940 1952 differential
3 35.6% 37.4% 1.8
10 33.5 34.7 1.2
50 21.6 12.3
500 8.9 —12.0
In the differential against stockholders these same variations among
income levels occur (panel D). Note how similar were the values of
the differential against stockholders at the extremes of the income
range in 1940 and how great the spread between them was in 1952.
The differential at the lowest income level rose slightly from the
beginning of our period to its end. Over the middle and at the top








for stockholders with very high incomes. In fact the fall was so great,
that we find, in every year but 1940 and 1941, that stockholders at
the $500,000 imputed gross income level were "undertaxed."(In
several years this was true also of the average $50,000 stockholder.)
One further point. The first three differentials reached their maximum
at the lowest income level and moved down regularly as income levels
rose. The differential against stockholders, however, reached its peak
(for the four income levels plotted) at $10,000. At this income level
the proportion of stockholder income represented by net corporate
earnings was sufficiently higher than the ratio characterizing the aver-
age $3,000 imputed gross income to more than compensate for the
effect of the higher differential against net corporate earnings found
at the lower of these two income levels.
In brief summary: Concentrating on the difference between the
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rate and personal income tax rates rose, and retentions comprised a
higher percentage of corporate earnings, the differentials tended to
fall, most notably at the higher income levels. The severity of the
overtaxation of corporate earnings and stockholders tended to decline,
and, at the higher income levels, undertaxation developed. With the
general decline in value of the differentials came a widening of the
spread between them because the decline was more pronounced in
the upper portion of the stockholder income range than at the lower
income levels.
A slightly different way of reviewing the same evidence is furnished
by examination of the net corporate tax and the net income tax saving
(Chart 5). The net corporate tax (explained in Chapter 1), taken as
CHART5—Net Corporate Tox and Net Personal Income
Tax Saving as Percentages of Stockholder Income at































a percentage of stockholder income, can be considered an incremental
rate of income tax on stockholders. The net income tax saving, like-
wise explained in Chapter 1, may be viewed as a rate of income tax
"benefit" for stockholders. The excess of the extra burden over the
benefit is the differential against stockholders.
Taking as our points for comparison the years 1940 and 1952, the
reader will note a slight rise in the net corporate tax percentage at
the lowest income level plotted on the upper section of Chart 5, and
a fall for the other incomes. The higher the income level, the greater
the decline, both absolutely and relatively. In the lower panel where
the tax saving is plotted, the pattern is similar but, in this case, more
pronounced. The net income tax saving percentages at the two lower
income levels rose moderately, and at the two upper levels the rate
of tax saving increased substantially. While over virtually the whole
income range the differential against stockholders fell, it can be seen
why it declined relatively little over the lower portion of this range,
and very much in the upper reaches of the income scale.
AVERAGES FOR THE PERIOD AS A WHOLE
Another way of summarizing the findings is to strike averages of the
differentials for all eleven years covered by the study. This procedure
is also useful in view of the effects on the values of the differentials
of variations from year to year in a number of factors. Averaging
tends to wash out peculiarities associated with any given year and to
provide a more "representative" picture.
Simple averages for each of the four measures, with the values for
each year given equal weight, are plotted on Chart 6. Over that por-
tion of the income range in which the majority of stockholders are
found (up to about $25,000 of imputed gross income) the part of the
corporation income tax levied on earnings for distribution constituted
a considerable extra burden on this segment of net corporate earnings—
30 per cent and over. Stockholders with incomes of $500,000 and over
were likewise subject to an extra burden on the earnings for distribu-
tion portion of their pro rata share of net corporate earnings, but
the incremental tax load was much less severe. For the small minority
of stockholders with imputed gross incomes from $100,000 to $500,000
the extra tax averaged from 15 to 7.5 per cent. The findings over the
period 1940-1952 (1942 and 1943 excluded) on the double taxation of
dividends (defined as earnings for payment of dividends or for dis-
tribution) may be summarized more starkly: stockholders at the $3,000
imputed gross income level were overtaxed by 34.2 per cent of cor-
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CHART 6—.-Average Differentials for the Period 1940-1952,
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Ratio scale
porate earnings on their behalf for distribution as dividends; stock-
holders with $500,000 of income were overtaxed by 7.5 per cent.
What about the undistributed segment of net corporate earnings?
Averages for the eleven years (see line 2 of Chart 6) reveal that most
stockholders were overtaxed on the earnings for retention component
of their incomes, while the high income minority were undertaxed.°
For stockholders with incomes up to about $12,000, the net incre-
mental burden ran between 28 and 37 per cent of their share of earn-
ingsfor retention;for stockholders with incomes ranging from
$100,000 through $500,000, the net tax benefit ranged from over 12
The atypical results in 1940 (and to a lesser extent in 1941) when, because of
relatively heavy deficits, the differential against earnings for retention, particularly
at the lower income levels, exceeded that on earnings for distribution, explains why
line 2 lies above line 1 over, this portion of the income range.
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per cent to about 28 per cent. The differences in the tax liability
between the lowest income level ($3,000) and the highest ($500,000)
stand out more strongly when the actual tax is compared with the
obligation that would have been incurred if earnings for retention
had been reached by the personal income tax alone. Stockholders at
the lowest income paid as tax 37 per cent more of their share of
- retainedearnings than they would have paid in personal income tax;
those at the top of the income range experienced a tax saving equal
- to28 per cent of their share of retained earnings.
The extra burdens on earnings for distribution and earnings for
retention together constitute the net additional tax liability on the
- corporateearnings component of stockholder incomes. This incre-
- mentaltax load expressed in percentage form(i.e. as a per cent of
netcorporate earnings) is the differential against net corporate earn-
earnings
- ings,which is a weighted sum of the differential against earnings for
distribution and the differential against (or in favor of) earnings for
retention. An average of the annual findings plotted on line 3 of the
- chartshows the following picture of differentials against the net cor-
porate earnings component of stockholder income: a significant degree
- ofovertaxation for stockholders with incomes below $15,000—ranging
from an additional tax load of over 30 per cent at the lowest income
level to nearly 25 percentage points of additional tax at the $15,000
- incomepoint; a more moderate degree of overtaxation for stockholders
with incomes over $15,000 and up to $75,000—ranging from an extra
tax load of 21 per cent at the $20,000 income level down to an addi-
I tionalburden of less than 3 per cent at the $75,000 level; and a notice-
200300500 able degree of undertaxation over the $75,000 income level, reaching
Ratioscale amaximum tax saving of almost 13 percentage points for stockholders
whose imputed gross income averaged $500,000.
dividends; stock- One further differential was investigated. How much heavier or
.5 per cent. (lighter) was the effective tax rate on stockholders than it would have
•porate earnings? been had there been no corporation income tax and stockholders were
reveal that most called to account fully and promptly on their pro rata share of net
component corporate earnings under the personal income tax? In other words, the
ere undertaxed.5 additional net burden was converted to an effective rate on all of
0, the net incre- stockholder income. The absolute amount of the net extra burden
eir share of earn- (or tax saving) is, of course, the same used in computing the differen-
sranging from tial against (or in favor of) net corporate earnings. Since, however,
ed from over 12 this amount is now related to a larger base, the differentials against
1) when, because of or in favor of stockholders will be lower than those against corporate
tention, particularly earnings. The ratio of net corporate earnings to imputed gross income,
button, explains why discussed in Chapter 2, tends to rise with income—increasing from
67CHANGES OVER TIME
about 20 per cent at the lowest income levels, to over 90 per cent at
the top of the income scale, Therefore, the differential against stock'
holders with low imputed gross incomes runs at only one-fifth of the
differential against net corporate earnings, but the differential in favor
of stockholders at the top of the income range runs at about 90 per
cent of the value of the differential in favor of net corporate earnings.
Again by way of simple summary, the annual values were computed
and plotted as line 4 of Chart 6. Stockholders whose income averaged
$25,000 or under, were subject to a sizeable incremental tax levy. In
effect they paid an additional tax that averaged between 6 and over
10 per cent of their total income. Over the income interval between
$20,000 and $75,000, there existed a smaller and declining additional
income tax on stockholders. At the top of the income scale, stockhold-
ers were undertaxed. Their combined corporate-personal income tax
was lower than what they would have had to pay if all their income
had been subject promptly and in full to the personal income tax
alone. This tax saving ranged from 0.7 per cent of total income (in-
come from all sources) in the case of the average stockholders at the
$100,000 imputed gross income level, to a sizeable 11 per cent for the
stockholder with $500,000 of income.
How much difference the corporation income tax alone made can
be seen from the data of Chart 7. (The top portion shows the net
corporate tax as a rate against net corporate earnings, and the lower
section shows it as a rate against all of the average stockholder's
income.)
On average, over the years 1940-1952 (excluding 1942 and 1943),
the corporate tax represented a heavy net extra burden on stock-
holders' pro rata share of net corporate earnings. A declining function
of the level of stockholder income, this extra income tax liability
ranged from 35 per cent of net corporate earnings at the bottom of
the stockholder income scale to 7 per cent at the top.
When related to all of stockholder income and not merely to one
component of it, the net corporate tax constituted a smaller but not
inconsiderable proportion. Stockholders with $1,000 of imputed gross
income, on average, were subject to 7 additional percentage points
of income tax, and those at the top of the income scale to a similar
increment. Over the middle span of incomes the net corporate tax ran
higher, reaching a maximum of about 13 per cent. Reading from
low to high incomes we find first a rise then a fall in the incremental
burden represented by the corporate tax.
But this is only part of the story. The failure of reinvested earnings
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eclining function rose with stockholder income (see solid lines on Chart 7).Overthe
Ime tax liability lower portion of the income range, it was quite unimportant, being
at the bottom of only 2 per cent of stockholder income at the $12,000 level. After this
op.
• point, the saving reached sizeable proportions—almost 18 per cent at
ot merely to one the top of the income range. The difference between the net corporate
smaller but not tax and the net income tax saving is the differential against stock-
of imputed gross holders. That story has already been told. It is not necessary to repeat
ercentage points it here.
scale to a similar Differences among the years covered by the study can be pointed
corporate tax ran up vividly by concentrating on the "cross-over" points,i.e.those
t. Reading from income levels at which the differential changes from positive to
i theincremental negative—from a burden to a benefit. Table 7 summarizes the relevant
data. In all years except 1940, at some high level of income the differ-
invested earnings
tax saving which
ential turned in favor of earnings for retention; similarly in every
year except 1940 and 1941, as incomes rose, the differentials turned
1 2 345 10 2030 40 50 100 200300500
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in favor of net corporate earnings and stockholders. In general, the
cross-over points reached furthest down the income scale in the several
years just following the war. In the years 1946 and 1947, corporate
rates were relatively low, personal rates remained rather high, and
retentions comprised a very high proportion of corporate earnings.
All this tended to cause low values of the differentials.
BRIEF ANALYSIS OF SELECTED YEARS
Factors that determine the values of the differentials varied consider-
ably over the period of the study. Some complexities of the inter-
relationships which constitute the crux of the problem under investi-
gation can be illuminated by examining these variations and their
effect on the height and pattern of the differentials.
The magnitude of the differentials is directly determined by the
four variables, described at the beginning of this chapter—the corpo-
rate rate, the personal tax rate, the relative size and importance
of distributions and retentions by corporations, and the weight of
corporate earnings in stockholder incomes.6 On the basis of these
magnitudes and also of their income level patterns the years of the
whole period fall roughly into four groups. One year from each
group has been chosen as representative with 1952 added as the most
recent, and four income levels have been selected as focal points for
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7 For simplicitythe dif
thefractions used in Chathis analysis. Summary information on the determining variables for
the years 1940, 1944, 1947, 1950, and 1952 appears in Table 8. In the
discussion of the findings, the following symbols are
C0 = Effective rate of corporate tax on earnings for distribution
Cr = Effective rate of corporate tax on earnings for retention
P = Applicable marginal rate of personal income tax
D0 = Differential against earnings for distribution
Dr = Differential against earnings for retention
= Differential against net corporate earnings
D6 = Differential against stockholders
The discussion is carried out in terms of variant 1(see the description
of the three variants in Chapter 1) because the relevant determinants
stand out most clearly, and no essential difference in principle is
involved.
1940
In this year, which marks the beginning of our period, legislated
corporate and personal income tax rates were lower than in any other
covered by the study. This is confirmed by the values for C6 and the
personal income tax rate listed in Table 8, but seems contradicted,
by the Cr of 78.6 per cent. This high Cr, however, is the rate on earnings
for retention computed net of deficits, and in 1940 deficits loomed
large in relation to retentions. (In the other years deficits were rela-
tively small; C,. was only between S and 6 percentage points higher
than C0).
Variations in the corporate and personal income tax rates exercise
an opposite effect on the differentials. The higher the corporate rate,
the higher the differentials; the higher the personal rate, the lower
the differentials. On net balance, these effects at the two lower income
levels brought the values of D, to the lowest for the period, whereas
for the two upper income levels in the table the values were smaller
in1947. In that year, at the two upper incomes, the applicable
marginal rates of personal income tax, designated by P, had risen
relatively more than C6; therefore D6, which is equal to C6 —C,P
failedto reach its 1940 values. The very large values for D,. in 1940
are the result of a high ratio of deficits to earnings. The retained
earnings of net income corporations were subject to the legal rate,
but when this tax liability is applied to net retentions(i.e. earnings
for retention of profit corporations minus losses of deficit corporations)
the result is a much higher effective rate on net earnings for retention.
I For simplicity the differentials are designated by single symbols rather than by
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This result is a logical corollary of our imputation procedure, for
deficits should be taken into account equally with earnings in deter-
mining the income of stockholders.
is a weighted average of D8 and Dr.Therelevant weights appear
in columns 9 and 10 of Table 8. Compared with the rest of the years
covered, the 1940 weight of earnings for retention was extremely low.
D8 generally lies very close to D8, but note the 1940 behavior of values
forD8 compared with those for D8. At all income levelstook a higher
value in 1940 than in either 1947 or 1950; at the two upper income
levels, it was higher in 1940 than in 1944 and 1952. Note also that the
heavy corporate rate on earnings for retention led to the absence of a
negative D8 at all income levels.(It is only for 1940 and 1941 that we
fail to find, somewhere up the income scale, a negative differential de-
veloping on net corporate earnings.)
D8 is equal to that fraction ofthat corporate earnings constituted
of stockholders' imputed gross income. These percentages, listed in
column 12, varied but slightly from year to year at any given stock.
holder income level. Thus, this proportion is not an important deter.
minant of year-to-year changes in the value of D8. The above expla.
nation of the variations in D8, therefore, applies also to variatiOns
in D,.
1944
The full weight of wartime tax increases is reflected in the data for
1944. Both corporate and personal tax rates reached levels never since
equaled. (The excess profits tax is included here in the corporate tax
liability.) The net result was the highest D6 of the period for stock-
holders at the lower income levels, and the smallest D8 at the top of
the income range.
Remember that D8 =C8 — C8P.Between 1940 and 1944, at the
$3,000 income level, C6 rose some 30.4 points. The subtracted term,
C8P,roseby 12.1 percentage points, hence an 18.3 increase in D8.
At the top of the income range ($500,000), we have, again, a 30.4
point increase in C0, but the term to be subtracted in arriving at D6
increased by more than this, i.e. by 34.9. D6, therefore, fell by 4.5.
Sinceis equal to —P,it can be seen that a similar interrela-
tion of the corporate and personal tax sets the value of Dr. Compare
once more the change between 1940 and 1944, at the $3,000 level:
while Cr declined 17 points, Dr fell by 35.8 points because P. the
term to be subtracted, had increased by 18.8.
Reflecting the fact that retentions came to a little more than divi-
dends in 1944, D8 lies somewhat closer to Dr than to D8. Compared
r
— —


























with 1940, the most obvious difference is the negative value at $500,000
of stockholder income. This results from the much lower Dr and its
greater weight in the later year. The remaining observations relevant
toand D, have already been made in connection with Dr and D6.
1947
This year contrasts strongly with 1944, with both relevant tax rates—
corporate and personal—being lower. The decline in the corporate
rate between these two years was considerably more pronounced than
the decline in the personal income tax rate schedule; the differentials
in 1947, therefore, were smaller than in 1944. Actually, with only the
exception of Deatthe top incomes, the combination of a low corporate
rate and high personal rate led to smaller differentials in 1947 than
in any other year of the period covered by our study.8
C,, was 23 points lower in 1947 compared with 1944. The decline
in D,, was less marked. At the $3,000 level C,,Pw.as13.2 in 1944 and
6.6 in 1947, hence the 16.4 fall in De. At the $500,000 stockholder
income level, however, we find a slight rise in D,,, for while C,, fell
23 points, C,,Pdeclined24.1 points, hence a rise in D,, from 4.1 to 5.2.
The only noteworthy point about Dr is the extremely large negative
differentials at the higher income levels. With retentions comprising
approximately two-thirds of corporate earnings, D,, lies closer to Dr
than D,,. More preciselyis equal to Dr plus about one-third of
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Compared with 1947, the 1950 corporate rate shows a rise and the
personal rate a decline. Both these factors work in the same direction,
exercising an upward push on the differentials which at every income
level were higher than in 1947.
At the $500,000 level why were Dr.and D8 for 1950 higher than
in 1944, but lower at the average $50,000 imputed gross income?
Because of the much sharper decline between these two years in P
at $50,000, which is traceable primarily to income-splitting first intro-
duced for joint returns in 1948. The major portion of returns at
$50,000 were joint returns. The weighted average marginal rate (for
joint and separate returns combined) was below 50 per cent. The
income-splitting effect is gradually lost as income rises to where most
of the income lies in the maximum marginal rate bracket; P for both
8 The corporate and personal income tax rates are designated low and high, re-
spectively, only in a relative sense, i.e.. compared to what they were in the othes
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CHANGES OVER TIME
types of return is therefore not so disparate. Specifically, comparing
1944 and 1950, the marginal rate of personal income tax applicable
to earnings for retention declined by 31 per cent at the $50,000 level,
but by only 12 per cent for the average $500,000 stockholder income.
Again, the heavier weight of Dr in the determination ofis demon-
strated by the fact that thevalues lie closer to Dr than to D8.
1952
Between 1950 and 1952 the corporate rate (embodying normal and
surtax rate increases and excess profits tax in effect throughout 1952
and for only the latter half of 1950) and personal rates both rose. In
general the rise in the corporate rate overshadowed that in the per-
sonal income tax rate schedule; the values of the differentials were
higher in 1952 than in 1950. The only exception occurred for D8 at
the $500,000 stockholder income level. Here the C8 increase of 8.7
points was smaller than the C6P rise of 11.9 points. D8 with C8P
subtracted from C6 in its derivation, fell by 3.2 points,i.e. from
10 to 6.8.
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